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INTRODUCTION
The concept of a mental model is widely discussed in studies of the interac-
tion of humans with their environment.  Unfortunately, the concept has be-
come very ambiguous, having been adopted by researchers approaching hu-
man cognitive functions from very different points of view.  The aim of the
present paper is to discuss the concept as seen from the point of view of
analysis and design of interfaces between humans and their work based on
advanced information technology.  What is the nature of humans' conception
of their work content, and how can computer-based information systems be
made transparent and support the proper mental models?
THE CONCEPT
In general, the concept of mental model is used to characterise features of the
resident knowledge base, representing properties of the task environment
which can serve the planning of activities and the control of acts when in-
stantiated and activated by observation of the actual state of affairs.
Craik's Mental Models
An early attempt to characterise the notion of a 'mental model' was Craik's
discussion (1943) of a mental model as a basis for explanation and under-
standing.  Craik mentions three essential processes of reasoning: "(1) 'Trans-
lation, of external process into words, numbers or other symbols, (2) Arrival at
other symbols by a process of reasoning', deduction, inference, etc., and (3)
'Retranslation' of these symbols into external processes (as building a bridge
to a design) or at least recognition of the correspondence between these sym-
bols and the external events (as in realising that a prediction is fulfilled)." He
then argues: "A calculating machine, an anti-aircraft 'predictor, and a Kelvin's
tidal predictor all show the same ability.  In all these cases, the physical proc-
ess which it is desired to predict is imitated by some mechanical device or
model which is cheaper, or quicker, or more convenient in operation. .... By a
model we thus mean any physical or chemical system which has a similar re-
lation-structure to that of the process it imitates.  By 'relation-structure' I do
not mean some obscure non-physical entity which attends the model, but the
f act that it is a physical working model which works in the same way as the
process it parallels, in the aspects under consideration." He continues: "... in
the case of our own nervous systems, the reason why I regard them as model-
ling the real process is that they permit trial of alternatives, in, e.g. bridge de-
sign, to proceed on a cheaper and smaller scale than if each bridge in turn
were built and tried by sending a train over it, to see whether it was suf f
iciently strong.,, Craik also emphasises the fact that models only represent a
selected set of relations: "Any kind of a working model is, in a sense, an anal-
ogy.  Being different it is bound to break down by showing properties not
found in the process it imitates or by not possessing properties possessed by
the process it imitates." (p. 51-53).  The implications of the latter statement
will be that for the representation of human knowledge in a complex working
context more than one 'mental model' should be considered.  In general,
Craik's conception of a model is very close to that of the engineering profes-
sion.
Two Recent Approaches to 'Mental Models'
After Craik's early use of the term model' for cognitive representations, the
theme has been considered from two different points of view.  Mental models
are the bridge between the work environment to be controlled and the mental
processes underlying this control.  Consequently, a study can be approached
by a study of human mental processes as well as by a study of work require-
ments, and these approaches result in different concepts.  The approach from
the psychological point of view quite naturally focuses on the explanation of
human performance, which often will be influenced by the AI related cognitive
science.  The focus of this research will be on the nature and form of the
mental model together with its role in human reasoning and its relations to
the 'mind' . Consequently, the criterion of success will often be whether a the-
ory can be phrased explicitly in procedural form for simulation on computer
(Johnson-Laird, 1983).
In contrast, the approach based on studies of actual work performance and
systems analysis will typically be looking for the content of the possible men-
tal models which will be effective for a given task repertoire in a specific work
domain.  The criterion of validity of the theories in this case will be whether
they are useful, i.e., whether functionality of human-machine systems can be
adequately predicted.
The two approaches are supplementary rather than competing and interaction
between them is important for the development of modern information tech-
nology.  The psychologically oriented approach serves to identify human rea-
soning mechanisms and resource profiles, while the approach from analysis of
work requirements is necessary so as to interrelate the different human
mechanisms in a complex work situation.  Together, such studies may add up
to be a response to Brunswik's request for an ecological psychology as a basis
for system design (Brunswik, 1957).
The Cognitive Science Approach
A typical representative of the cognitive science approach is Johnson-Laird
(1983).  He distinguishes "at least three types of mental representations: pro-
positional representations which are strings of symbols that correspond to
natural language, mental models which are structural analogues of the world,
and images which are perceptual correlates of models from a particular point
of view." Basically, he categorises the form of representations rather than
their content - which is in correspondence with his discussion from the point
of view of modelling the reasoning mechanisms.  He distinguishes flat least
two levels of representation: a representation of the sense of a discourse, and
a representation of its significance (including what it refers to).  This distinction
is precisely what is captured in the theory of propositional representations and
mental models.,' (p. 395)
Johnson-Laird derives his concepts of mental models from a discussion o.f
basic reasoning procedures, e.g., syllogistic or propositional reasoning, hence
the requirement of procedural, computational tests.  He takes the position
that "a natural mental model of discourse has a structure that corresponds
directly to the structure of the state of affairs that the discourse describes".
The structure Johnson-Laird has in mind appears to be the physical anatomy
of the environment.  He states on the nature of mental models: "Mental mod-
els owe their evolution to the perceptual ability in organisms with nervous
systems." Referring to David Marr's (1982) work he concludes: "It is therefore
safe to assume that a primary source of mental models – three dimensional
kinematic models of the world - is perception.,' This formulation brings John-
son-Laird's concepts close to the concept of the "dynamic world model,, dis-
cussed in a subsequent section.  Thus, Johnson-Laird's mental models basi-
cally are representations of the context of reasoning, the "background" (Searle,
1983).  Johnson-Laird says: "The meaning of a sentence, according to the
principle of compositionality, is a function of the meanings of its words and
the syntactic relations between them.  Meaning, however, is an abstract no-
tion that reflects only what is determined by a knowledge of the language.
The significance of an utterance goes beyond meaning because it depends on
recovering referents and some minimal idea of the speaker's intentions.  The
truth conditions of the proposition expressed by a sentence therefore depend
on the meaning of the sentence, its context of utterance (as represented in the
current mental model), and the implicit inferences that it triggers from back-
ground knowledge." In this way, Johnson-Laird's mental models are repre-
sentation of the context or background by which propositional reasoning- is
possible, i.e., his 'mental models' include the intuitive knowledge which es-
capes the representation by the explicit formulation in terms of the semantic
nets of the AI community.
In this respect, Johnson-Laird continues a well established tradition.  The
need for a representation of the context for understanding language as well as
for control of skilled movements has long been discussed in the philosophical
literature.  Polanyi (1967) has made thorough studies of the importance of
"tacit" knowledge.  Mackie (1975) found it necessary to introduce the notion of
a "field" as the representation of the context in his efforts to define causality in
common sense descriptions of event sequences.  Recently, Searle (1983) has
argued the importance of the "background" which in his terms is the "non-
representational" something underlying mental representations, "intentional
states".  Mental representations form a network of intentional states, and the
semantic content of a state depends on its location in this network.  However,
"anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the network will
eventually reach a bedrock of mental capacities that do not themselves con-
sist in intentional states (representations), but nonetheless form the precon-
ditions for the functioning of intentional states.  His arguments for the exis-
tence of the "background" is very analogous to the present arguments for the
internal world model: "The background is necessary to account f or the f act
that the literal meaning of a sentence is not a context-free notion, for under-
standing of metaphors, and to explain physical skills as for instance needed
in expert skiing".
Other approaches to the mental model concept from the artificial intelligence
point of view have been presented by Gentner and Stevens (1983).  Typically,
the contributions to this collection focus on the representation of reasoning
procedures by means of computer programs and, consequently, the problem
domains discussed are rather simple and derived from naive physics, or from
the immediate experience of computer scientists with, for instance, calcula-
tors or word processors.  In the present discussion, the tentative taxonomy of
features of mental models discussed by Young (1983) is of interest.  He men-
tions several classes of models, but focuses the discussion of models on sur-
rogates (i.e., analogies) and cue-action mappings of students during the use of
calculators.  His conclusion is that surrogates are biased towards the "rea-
soning criteria", and suited for explanation and prediction while they are lim-
ited in the use of a device.  Mappings are better suited to "provide an overall
characterisation of the machine to orient the user's behaviour".  These catego-
ries and their performance implications are closely related to declarative and
procedural models underlying knowledge-based and rule-based performance
discussed below.
A natural consequence of the computational approach is a focus on a well
bounded aspect of mental representation in the form of a ,mental model, in
order to be able to embed it in a computer program.  This, in turn, means that
only rather simple and well structured problems can be approached or the
danger will be that the reasoning procedure will turn out rather artificial.  A
case in point is the efforts of Brown and De Kleer (see for instance 1983) to
develop computational models of qualitative reasoning about the functioning
of physical devices.  In order to have a manageable model for simulation, they
assume that explanation of the functioning is inferred bottom-up from a rep-
resentation of the structure of the device in terms of the topology of compo-
nent connections together with component properties.  This approach can be
useful to model 'naive physics, reasoning e.g., on simple kinematic problems
such as predicting the movements of objects given the initial conditions.
When considering, however, the functioning of rather complex goal oriented
artefacts from a general question of "how the work", the resulting reasoning
procedure becomes very artificial.  We will return to this topic in a subsequent
section discussing the use of means-end relations for functional reasoning.
The Cognitive Engineering Approach
Approaching the question of mental representations from the point of view of
actual work performance, a focus on selected, wellformed aspects of mental
models cannot be maintained.  From the analysis of verbal protocols from
actual work (Rasmussen and Jensen, 1973) our attention was drawn towards
the interaction of several different kinds of mental representations (Rasmus-
sen, 1986).  Furthermore, the analysis of human errors in process plant op-
eration has shown that the interaction of performance under control of basi-
cally different kinds of mental representations has to be considered (Rasmus-
sen, 1980).  Other studies of human performance in actual industrial work
situations also have shown the need for analysing the difference between the
representations brought to work by persons with different professional back-
grounds and levels of training (De Keyser, 1987; Hery, 1987).
A natural consequence of this approach will be that the mental representa-
tions under work situations cannot be formulated in one well structured
simulation language.  Several different research models of the various mental
representations have to be accepted (see the 'catalogue of models, in Rasmus-
sen, 1986), and validation of the models will basically be a test of their pre-
dictive ability for systems design, i.e., validation depends to a large degree on
evaluation of system. during actual work conditions.  In order to have a
framework for mapping the properties of different kinds of mental representa-
tions, a discussion of the cognitive control of skilled work performance will be
useful.
MODES OF COGNITIVE CONTROL
The point of view of the following discussion, therefore, is taken from the
analysis of performance in complex work situations and from the require-
ments met when designing computer based interfaces.  For such purposes to
be satisfied, it is necessary to study the interaction of a wide variety of mental
strategies and models.  In particular, study of the interaction and interference
between different modes of cognitive control appear to be important for the
understanding of erroneous performance.
When we distinguish categories of human behaviour according to basically
different ways of representing the properties of a deterministic environment as
a basis for control of actions, three typical levels of performance emerge: skill-
, rule-, and knowledge-based performance.  These levels and a simplified il-
lustration of their interrelation are shown in Figure 1.
Skill-based behaviour represents sensori-motor perf ormance during acts or
activities that, af ter a statement of an intention, take place without conscious
control as smooth, automated, and highly integrated patterns of behaviour.
In most skilled sensori-motor tasks, the body acts as a multivariable, con-
tinuous control system synchronising movements with the behaviour of the
environment.  This performance is based on feed-forward control and depends
upon a very flexible and efficient dynamic world model.  In some cases, per-
formance is one continuous, integrated dynamic whole, such as bicycle riding
or musical performance.  In these cases the higherlevel control may take the
form of conscious anticipation of upcoming demands in general terms, re-
sulting in an updating of the state of the dynamic world model and thereby in
the appropriate "modulation" of the skilled response.  In general, human ac-
tivities can be considered as a sequence of such skilled acts or activities com-
posed for the actual occasion.  The flexibility of skilled performance is due to
the ability to compose from a large repertoire of automated subroutines the
sets suited for specific purposes.  The individual routines are activated and
chained by perceived patterns that are acting as signs, the person is not con-
sciously choosing among alternatives.
At the next level of rule-based behaviour, the composition of a sequence of
subroutines in a familiar work situation is typically consciously controlled by
a stored rule or procedure that may have been derived empirically during pre-
vious occasions, communicated from other persons' know-how as an instruc-
tion or a cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious
problem solving and planning.  The point is here that performance is goal-
oriented, but structured by "feed-forward control" through a stored rule, in
other words, the person is aware that alternative actions are possible and has
to make a choice.  The choice is based on 'signs' in the environment which
have been found to be correlated to one of the alternative actions.  Very often,
the goal is not even explicitly formulated, but is found implicitly in the situa-
tion releasing the stored rules.  The control is teleologic in the sense that the
rule or control is selected from previous successful experiences.  The control
evolves by "survival of the fittest" rule.
In general, skill-based 'performance rolls along without conscious attention,
and the actor will be unable to describe the information used to act.  The
higher-level rule-based co-ordination in general is based on explicit know-
how, and the rules used can be reported by the person, although the cues re-
leasing a rule may not be explicitly known.
During unfamiliar situations for which no know-how or rules for control are
available from previous encounters, the control must move to a higher con-
ceptual level, in which performance is goalcontrolled, and knowledge-based
(knowledge is here taken in a rather restricted sense as possession of a con-
ceptual, structural model or, in AI terminology, of deep knowledge.  The level,
therefore, might also be called model-based').  In this situation, the goal is ex-
plicitly formulated, based on an analysis of the environment and the overall
aims of the person.  Then a useful plan is developed - by selection.  Different
plans are considered and their effect tested against the goal, physically by
trial and error, or conceptually by means of 'thought experiments'.  At this
level of functional reasoning, the internal structure of the system is explicitly
represented by a "mental model" that may take several different forms.  A very
important aspect of the cognitive control to be captured by models of human
behaviour is the dynamic interaction between the activities at the three levels.
Skill, Rules and Knowledtqe in Problem Solving
Problem solving takes place when the reaction of the environment to possible
human actions is not known from prior experience, but must be deduced by
means of a mental representation of the ,relational structure' of the environ-
ment.  This structure must be represented symbolically in a mental model.  A
major task in knowledge-based problem solving is to transfer those properties
of the environment which are related to the perceived problem to a proper
symbolic representation.  The information observed in the environment is
then perceived as 'symbols, with reference to this mental model.
Formation of a proper representation depends on knowledge about the basic
laws governing the behaviour of the environment.  This phase of problem
solving is finished when a representation in a framework familiar to the per-
son is obtained - which means a mental model for which a set of rules for in-
formation processing is available.  The representation then ceases to be an
informative, symbolic framework and turns into a prescriptive system of signs
that control the application of stereotyped process rules.
If the representation then is externalised in the form of a physical or graphic
model, it is evident that the same kind of rule- and skill-based operation can
be developed, as it is found for operation on a physical environment.  The effi-
ciency of formal, mathematical models and technical graphs and diagrams, as
e.g., control engineers' Bode plots and pole-zero graphs, depends on the exis-
tence of a large repertoire of stereotyped manipulation rules used for solutions
and predictions - often to a degree where the engineer's fundamental under-
standing of the conceptual basis has completely decayed.
The conclusion of this discussion is that patterns in a symbolic model con-
figuration, as is the case with perceptual patterns of the physical environ-
ment, can act as signs.  This is most clearly seen if externalised representa-
tions of the mental model are actually available in the form of physical mod-
els, e.g., an abacus for calculation, or in the form of graphs or other symbolic
representations on paper or on visual information displays, forming artificial
objects for manipulation.  For display formats this means that rule- or skill-
based control - "direct manipulation" - at a higher abstract level can be ob-
tained if a symbolic display can be designed where there is a one-to-one map-
ping between the immediate appearance of the display and the properties of
the process to be controlled.  In this way, the same conceptual model may act
as a symbolic representation when considered in relation to the elements of
the environment and the laws controlling their relationships, and as a system
of prescriptive signs when considered in relation to the rules for model trans-
formation and data processing.
The distinction between signs and symbols in representations in the sense
discussed above is equivalent to the distinction in semiotics and information
science between prescriptive and informative texts (Morris, 1971; Eco, 1979).
The important point in the present context is, however, related to the fact that
the same text - or model - will be considered as either prescriptive or informa-
tive by the same person, depending upon the situation.  An important ques-
tion is therefore how the cognitive level needed is activated and what informa-
tion in fact serves this activation.
The role of a functional representation as prescriptive signs has been studied
from a semiotic point of view by Cuni and Boy6 (1981).  They analysed the
role of electrical circuit diagrams in terms of signs controlling activities during
design, installation, and repair of electrical power supply systems in private
houses, and investigated how different appearance of the same functional dia-
gram was effective for support of the different activities.
Skills, Rules and Knowledcre as Stages in LearninLcf a Skill
It is clear from the discussion in the previous section that the three levels of
control are intimately interacting.  In order to evaluate the degree to which the
underlying models are separate concepts or just different aspects of the same
internal representation, it may be useful to discuss how they relate to learn-
ing.
Distinctions between different categories of human behaviour similar to the
SRK-levels have previously been proposed in relation to learning a skill.  Fitts
and Posner (1962) distinguish between three phases: the early or cognitive
phase, the intermediate or associative phase, and the final or autonomous
phase.  If we consider that in real life a person will meet situations with a
varying degree of training when performing his task depending on variations
and disturbances, the correspondence with the three levels in the present
context is clear.
In the three-level model, the final stage in adaptation to a task environment is
the skill-based level.  During training the necessary sensori-motor patterns
develop, while the activity is controlled by other means.  It may happen di-
rectly at the skilled level by imitation and trial-and-error, as for instance,
learning to play an instrument by ear or children learning to talk, walk, etc.
In other cases, control at the rule-based behavioural level will be efficient
during development of the automated skill.  The rules may be obtained from
an instructor or a textbook, as is typically the case when learning to drive a
car, to operate tools and technical devices supplied with an instruction man-
ual, or to manage social interactions from "rules of good manners".  And, fi-
nally, persons with a basic knowledge of the structure and functioning will be
able to generate themselves a set of rules to control activities related to vari-
ous purposes during early phases of learning.  This involves what Anderson
(1983) calls 'compiling declarative knowledge.,
Human errors are closely related to this learning process.  Fine tuning of
manual skills depends upon a continuous updating of the sensory-motor
schemata to the time-space features of the task environment.  If the optimi-
sation criteria are speed and smoothness, the limits of acceptable adaptation
can only be found by the once-in-a-while experience gained when crossing the
precision tolerance limits, i.e. by the experience of errors or near-errors.  Also
at the more consciously controlled rule-following level, development of know-
how and rules-of-thumb is depending upon a basic variability and opportu-
nity for experiments to find shortcuts and identify convenient and reliable
signs which make it possible to recognise recurrent conditions without ana-
lytical diagnosis.  Involved in problem solving, test of hypothesis becomes an
important need.  It is typically expected that for instance process operators
check their diagnostic hypothesis conceptually by thought experiments - be-
fore operations on the plant.  This, however, appears to be an unrealistic as-
sumption, since it may be tempting to test a hypothesis on the system itself in
order to avoid the strain from reasoning in-a complex causal net.
An important point is that it is not the behavioural patterns of the higher lev-
els that are becoming automated skills.  Automated time-space behavioural
patterns are developing while they are controlled and supervised by the higher
level activities - which will eventually deteriorate - and their basis as knowl-
edge and rules may deteriorate.  In fact, the period when this is happening
may lead to errors due to interference between a not fully developed sensori-
motor skill and a gradually deteriorated rule system.  This kind of interference
is known also to highly skilled musicians when they occasionally start to
analyse their performance during fast passages.  It seems plausible also that
this effect can play a role for pilots of about 100 hours flying experience,
which is known to be an error-prone period among pilots.
Anderson (1983) also discusses the interaction between declarative knowledge
and procedural knowledge.  He describes the development of procedural
knowledge during learning as a 'compilation'.  Generally, compilation refers to
a transformation of knowledge by means of a formal procedure.  According to
the SRK-framework, however, procedural knowledge derived by compilation of
declarative mental models is a possible, but not an inevitable, first phase of
rule-based behaviour.  In later phases procedural knowledge is typically not
derived from the basic, 'deep' knowledge, but has an empirical, heuristic ba-
sis, and compilation is not a suitable metaphor.
Following the lines of reasoning suggested above, the transfer of control to
new mental representations is a very complex process involving change along
several different orthogonal dimensions.  First, when trained responses evolve,
the structure of the underlying representation shifts from a set of separate
component models toward a more holistic representation.  This is discussed
by Bartlett (1943) in relation to pilot fatigue, and Moray (1986) analyses how
such model aggregation can lead process operators into trouble during plant
disturbances, because the process is irreversible, i.e., the regeneration of a
structured model needed for causal reasoning in unfamiliar situations is not
possible from the aggregated model.  The learning model implied in the SRK
framework indicates that skill acquisition involves not only an aggregation of
mental models.  Typically, control by a structural, declarative model will also
be replaced by an empirical procedural representation concurrent with a shift
from a symbolic to a stereotype sign interpretation of observations.  This
means that training involves at least three concurrent and structurally inde-
pendent shifts, in terms of aggregation, of declarative procedural knowledge,
and of interpretation of information.
If this model of learning a skill is accepted and skill/rule-based performance
is characteristic of professional activities in general, one would expect the ba-
sic causal or functional understanding to deteriorate.  This is in fact what is
the evidence found by Ackermann and Barbichon (1963) from their analysis of
the Organisation of knowledge and the explanation of phenomena as pre-
sented by electrical and chemical technicians in industry.  Based on an
analysis of interviews, their conclusions were that the professional knowledge
of the technicians was fragmented, showed a lack of relationship among phe-
nomena, had barriers between theory, practice, and extra-professional life,
and lack of relationship among various representations - mathematical,
graphic, concrete, and analogical - of a particular phenomenon.  One expla-
nation could be, as the authors suggest, that theoretical knowledge is not
used and that their findings reveal rudimentary memories from basic educa-
tion.  But, seen in our context, it could also be that basic symbolic knowledge
and representations are typically used to support stereotyped lines of func-
tional reasoning in various typical situations, and causal reasoning therefore
turns into rule- and skill-based manipulations of symbolic representations
which will thereby lose their symbolic nature and theoretical relationship.
Analysis of the functional explanations of f ered by the technicians inter-
viewed by Ackermann and Barbichon was characteristic by resort to what the
authors call verbal nominalisms, i.e., the use of technical terms without un-
derstanding their content or relationship, or verbal logicism, as for instance
pseudo-analogies or replacement of logical sequences with chronologic se-
quences from the problem context.  A general trend found is the replacement
of functional arguments by reference to human interaction, a tendency that
can be explained by the tight relationships between human acts and symbols
which are degenerated into mere signs.
A TAXONOMY OF MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
From this discussion, a taxonomy of mental representations can be proposed.
It is proposed to restrict the term mental model to the representation of the
relational structure' of the environment, to follow Craik's definition.  This
means, the mental model is a representation of the fundamental constraints
determining the possible behaviour of the environment, i.e., it is useful to an-
ticipate its response to acts or events when instantiated by state information.
The study of errors have made it clear that a taxonomy of representations
should not only consider the higher level cognitive functions related to infer-
ence and reasoning, the role of the body in the control of sensori-motor per-
formance is an integrated part of the system.  In the following section, the
representations related to actual working performance according to the skill-
,rule-,and knowledge distinction are discussed in more detail.
Representations at the Skill-Based Level
Performance at the skill-based level depends on a dynamic world model which
has a perceptual basis, like Johnson-Laird's mental model.  The model is acti-
vated by patterns of sensory data acting as signs, and synchronised by spatio-
temporal signals.
This dynamic world model can be seen as a structure of hierarchically defined
representation of objects and their behaviour in a variety of familiar scenarios,
i.e., their functional properties, what they can be used for, and their potential
for interaction, or what can be done to them.  These elements of a generic
analogue simulation of the behaviour of the environment are updated and
aligned according to the sensory information during interaction with an envi-
ronment.  The model is structured with reference to the space in which the
person acts and is controlled by direct perception of the features of relevance
to the person's immediate needs and goals.
This conception is similar to Minsky's (1975) "frames".  The main and funda-
mental - difference is that Minsky's frames depend on a sequential scene
analysis; they are structured as networks of nodes and relations, and they are
basically static.  Minsky defines frames as a data structure for representing
stereotyped situations which are organised as a network of nodes and rela-
tions.  Gibson's (1966) concepts related to "direct perception" are far more
convincing, viewed as a model of the high-capacity information processing
mechanisms underlying perception, sensori-motor performance in fast se-
quences, etc., than Minsky's symbolic information processing.  The latter is
more adequate for higherl-evel conscious information processing, i.e., the
manifestations of the "dynamic world model" at the conscious level in terms of
natural language representations.
The "dynamic world model,, in the present context is very similar to the
mechanisms needed for the "atonement of the whole retino-neuro-muscular
system to invariant information" (Gibson, 19@6, p. 262), which leads to the
situation where "the centres of the nervous system, including the brain, reso-
nate to information".  This selective resonance relies on the existence of some
kind of dynamic model of the environment.  The control of skilled performance
by an active analogue model raises some interesting modelling problems, in
particular as seen from the point of view of digital computer based AI.  Skilled
behaviour cannot meaningfully be decomposed into parts without a shift in
domain of description to neuro-physiology.  Behaviour of an active model is
not controlled by rules, but by the laws controlling the behaviour of the in-
volved physical system or, as Searle has phrased it "there is no computational
answer to that; it is just done by the hardware" (Searle, 1984).  The role of the
dynamic world model for representation of the context - 'background, - of
higher level cognitive functions makes this a basic problem of simulating in-
telligent human behaviour by present AI technology, as mentioned already by
Dreyfus (1972): the problem with computers is not that they lack a brain; but
that they lack the human body.  From this point of view it is worth noting the
recent revival in terms of 'connectionism' (Feldman et al., 1986) or PDP, i.e.,
'parallel distributed processing' (Rummelhart et al., 1986), of the interest in
parallel processing and self-organising networks which was characteristic of
the bio-technological research of the 60'es (see for instance Oestreicher et al.
1966).
To Gibson, perception is not based on processing of information contained in
an array of sense data.  Instead, the perceiver, being attuned to invariant in-
formation in space and time in his environment, samples this invariant infor-
mation directly through all senses.  That is, arrays of sense data are not
stored or remembered.  Instead the nerve system "resonates".  In my terms,
the world model, activated by the needs and goals of the individual, is up-
dated and aligned by generic patterns in the sensed information, but the idea
of an organism "tuning in" on generic time space properties is basically simi-
lar and leads to the view of humans as selective and active seekers of infor-
mation at a high level of invariance in the environmental context.
Like the perceptual function, motor control is not based on stored behaviour
patterns from prior encounters, but on a constructive process that generates
the proper patterns on demand (Bernstein, 1967).  This is demonstrated by
the fact that the success of rapid movements is independent of the initial po-
sitions of limbs and that movements can be transferred to other metric pro-
portions and limbs.  This function must depend on schemata for generating
complex movements with reference to the internal dynamic world model.  An
important ingredient in motor control is the dynamic feed-forward generation
of patterns within this internal dynamic map which is updated and aligned by
the sensory information.
From the role in human behaviour, some of the functional features of the
world model can be summarised:
-It is able to control bodily movements in a feed-forward mode of control dur-
ing fast sequences, i.e., it is capable of real time, quantitative, and precise
simulation of the time-space patterns of the environment, and it is an ac-
tive model.
-It is a hierarchical representation; it enables recognition of objects and
scenes at the level of physical appearance; it makes it possible to identify
objects by their functional values rather than their appearance; and pat-
terns of purposive behaviour can be activated by high level intentions.
-There is a very efficient mapping between features of the environment and
the model; i.e., a very efficient updating of the model is possible in response
to changes, as well as easy transfer to "similar,, scenarios.  This points to
an analog model with elements representing objects and their functional
properties and values, and consequently a one-to-one mapping of elements
in the environment onto the model.
It is important to repeat that the three levels of control are not alternatives.
The skill-based level is always active; the dynamic world model supplies the
contextual basis for all performance (compare the role of Johnson-Laird's
mental model), it directs attention, activates higher level performance, and
based on higher level intentions expressed in terms of goals or activities it
controls information gathering and transforms intentions, to control of move-
ments.
Representations at the Rule-Based Level
At the rule-based level, system properties are only implicitly represented in
the empirical mapping of cue-patterns representing states of the environment
and actions or activities relevant in the specific context supplied by the un-
derlying dynamic world model.  According to the definition adopted here, this
representation does not qualify as a mental model since it does not support
anticipation of responses to acts or events not previously met, and it will not
support explanation or understanding except in the form of reference to prior
experience.
In order to prepare for rule-based control of activities, however, conceptual
relations may be important.  Descriptive relations are useful in assigning at-
tributes to categories and, therefore, to label scenarios and contexts for iden-
tification of items to retrieve from memory.  Descriptive labels are the basis for
updating of the focus for intuitive judgements and for establishing the proper
"background" of action and communication.  As could be expected from re-
search on memory (Bartlett, 1932; Tulving, 1983), episodic relations are im-
portant for structuring of memory.  Episodic relations appear to be important
for labelling prototypical situations to serve as tacit "frames" or context for
intuitive judgements and skilled performance.
Representations at the Knowledge-Based Level
In the present context, the representations at the knowledge-based level con-
stitutes the proper 'mental models, being representations of the relational
structure of the causal environment and work content.  Many different kinds
of relationships are put to work during reasoning and inference at this level,
depending on the circumstances, whether the task is to diagnose a new
situation, to evaluate different aspect of possible goals, or to plan appropriate
actions.  Two kinds of relationships, i.e., part-whole and means-end relations
appear to be particularly important for the specification of the content and di-
rection of problem solving processes and will be considered in some detail.
These two dimensions constitute the problem space.  The part-whole dimen-
sion is well suited to delimit the section of the problem environment which is
actually within the span of attention, whereas the meansend dimension
specifies the level of generality at which the problem present will be consid-
ered, i.e., the language in terms of model concepts which is used.  Figure 2
illustrates the trajectory of the changing focus of attention in this problem
space of an engineer during fault-finding an a digital computer system.
In the functional means-end hierarchy, the functional properties of the envi-
ronment are represented by concepts that belong to several levels of abstrac-
tion; see Figure 3. In the present discussion, the focus will be on mental mod-
els of a physical system built to serve some human goal.  The lowest level of
abstraction represents only the physical configuration of objects and their lo-
cations, the material configuration of the system.  The next higher level repre-
sents the physical processes or functions of the various components and sys-
tems in a language related to their specific electrical, chemical, or mechanical
properties.  Above this, the functional properties are represented in more gen-
eral concepts without reference to the physical process or equipment by which
the functions are implemented, and so forth.
When moving from one level of abstraction to the next higher level, the change
in system properties represented is not merely removal of details of informa-
tion on the physical or material properties.  More fundamentally, information
is added on higher level principles governing the co-ordination of the various
functions or elements at the lower level.  In man-made systems these higher-
level principles are naturally derived from the purpose of the system, i.e., from
the reasons for the configurations at the level considered.  A change of level of
abstraction involves a shift in concepts and structure for representation as
well as a change in the information suitable to characterise the state of the
function or operation at the various levels of abstraction.  Thus an observer
asks different questions of the environment depending on the nature of the
currently active internal representation.
In other words, models at low levels of abstraction are related to a specific
physical world which can serve several purposes.  Models at higher levels of
abstraction are closely related to a specific purpose which can be met by sev-
eral physical arrangements.  Therefore shifts in the level of abstraction can be
used to change the direction of paths, suitable for transfer of knowledge from
previous cases and problems.  At the two extreme levels of models, the direc-
tions of the paths available for transfer are in a way orthogonal, in that
transfer at one level follows physical, material properties, while at the other it
follows purpose.
At each level of abstraction reasoning depends on a particular type of model
and rules for information processing.  Therefore, shifting the level of modelling
can be very effective in a problem situation because data processing at an-
other level can be more convenient, the process rules can be simpler or better
known, or results can be available from previous cases.  A special instance of
this strategy is the solution of a problem by analogy, which depends upon the
condition that different physical systems have the same representation at
higher levels of abstraction.  Higher level models for one physical configura-
tion may therefore be reinterpreted to solve problems related to a quite differ-
ent, unfamiliar configuration.
Physical systems with known and invariant internal structure are responding
to changes and to human acts according to basic laws of nature which there-
fore can be used to predict their behaviour.  They are causal systems, and
their response to physical changes for which no experience is available to an
observer can be explained or predicted by means of bottom-up reasoning in
the abstraction hierarchy, i.e., by functional analysis.
This approach is not possible for all the environments in which humans have
to make decisions.  Systems with a high degree of autonomous internal func-
tioning, with self-organising and highly adaptive features (as for instance
when humans are part of the work environment), will change their internal
functional organisation continuously in order to meet the requirements of the
environment and to suit their internal goals or performance criteria.  Even
though such systems basically may be controlled by laws of nature, their
complexity in general makes it impossible to explain or predict their perform-
ance by functional analysis during real-life decision making.  The alternative
is to consider such systems as intentional systems controlled by motives or
intentions together with the constraints on performance posed by the envi-
ronment physically or in the form of conventions and legal requirements and
by the limiting capabilities of their internal mechanisms.
Decision making in control of intentional systems is based on knowledge of
the value structures of the system, the actual input from the environment of
the system, and its internal, limiting properties - i.e., it is based on reasoning
top-down @'in the abstraction with little or no consideration of the internal
causal structures or functions.  This is probably the reason why top-level ex-
ecutive decision makers, according to Mintzberg's study (Mintzberg, 1973), do
not behave according to analytical decision models, but prefer live action and
constant consumer contacts instead of analysis of abstract reports, and cur-
rent information even gossip and hearsay - for statistics and status reports.
Meeting people and considering hearsay is probably the best sources of infor-
mation on current trends in value structures.
Many technical systems such as control systems and information processing
systems are very complex and have no simple relationship between their basic
physical processes and their function in the information domain.  Therefore,
predictions regarding their behaviour are more readily made when considering
the systems as intentional systems (Dennett, 1971).  Even in case of relatively
simple systems, operators can be seen in verbal protocols to develop an ex-
planation of system behaviour from a top-down "re-design" of a reasonable
functional structure from its supposed purpose, rather than to collect infor-
mation on its actual, physical structure.
An illustrative example of the role of means-end relations can be found when
comparing a decision task which has to be performed in a one-level formal de-
scription with the performance when the intentional context is also available.
The difference may partly be due to the use of shifts in level of abstraction to
find paths for transfer of solutions and strategies by analogy, but also due to
support of memory and search for rules in terms 'of structures at other levels
of abstraction.  A good empirical piece of evidence is the reasoning experiment
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972).  Their experiment showed significantly
better performance when a problem was embedded in the subjects' every-day
experience, compared to the same problem in an abstract formulation.  The
difference in performance in the two cases probably can be explained by the
role of means-end relations in the actual problem solving.  In the abstract
formulation, the problem solving is based on formal, logical arguments at only
one level of abstraction, on syllogistic logic which requires manipulation of
abstract symbols and storage of intermediate results in short-term memory.
Embedded in a familiar setting, the context defines an intentional system, in
which the effects of the different decisions can very easily be inferred at the
higher levels.  The reasons for proper states can be inferred top-down.  The
problem is solved by top-down model modification, by transferring to a model
of "reasonable states of affairs".
The role of a multilevel abstraction hierarchy in problem solving is most ex-
plicitly seen in Duncker's (1943) research on practical problem solving related
to physical, causal systems (radioactive tumour treatment and functioning of
a temperature-compensated pendulum).  Based on verbal protocols, Duncker
describes how subjects go from the problem to a solution by a sequence of
consideration where the items proposed can be characterised by a "functional
value,, feature pointing upwards to the problem, and a "by means of which"
feature pointing downwards to the implementation of a solution; The relation
to the means-end hierarchy is clear.
Yet another observation on the role of an abstraction hierarchy on under-
standing a mechanical device has been reported by Rubin (1920), who reports
an analysis of his own efforts to understand the function of a mechanical
shutter of a photographic camera.  He finds that consideration of purpose or
reason plays a major role in the course of arguments: he conceived all the
elements of the shutter in the light of their function in the whole.  He did not
perceive the task to explain how the individual parts worked, but rather what
their functions were in the whole.  How they worked was immediately clear
when their function was known.  He mentions that he finds it an analytical
task to identify the function of parts, the direction of thought being from over-
all purpose to the individual function (top-down considerations).  The hy-
pothesis necessary to control the direction is then readily available.  This ap-
proach was found to have additional advantages: solutions of sub-problems
have their place in the whole picture, and it is immediately possible to judge
whether a solution is correct or not.  In contrast, arguing from the parts to the
"way they work" is much more difficult as a result of being a synthesis.  Solu-
tions of sub-problems must be remembered in isolation and their correctness
is not immediately apparent.
An interesting, albeit indirect, demonstration of the importance of means-end
relations for functional reasoning is the difficulties met by AI attempts to
model the function of mechanical devices 'bottom-up' from the function of the
components.  De Kleer and Brown find that determining the function of a de-
vice like an electric buzzer solely from its structure and the behaviour of the
parts require complex reasoning.  The inference model proposed is based on
an examination of the propagation of events through the structure.  In an
earlier presentation, a basic principle was the no-function-in-structure' as-
sumption (Brown et al. 1981).  In a later discussion, however, inference is
guided by 'class-wide, assumptions and functional evidence, which in fact ap-
pear to be a representation of purpose in disguise.  The resulting inference
process appear to be very artificial, compared to the top-down inference proc-
ess guided by functional considerations such as those described by Rubin.  In
the De Kleer-Brown model, it will be difficult to see the wood for trees, while Rubin's
description appears to be guided by a birds’ eye perspective.
A number of conceptual relations, in addition to part-whole and means-end
relations discussed in the previous sections, will be useful for operation on a
problem representation in the knowledge based domain.  When means for ac-
tion has been chosen from perceived means-end relations in a particular work
context, causal relations are used to judge the effect of actions.  Value aspects
are important for choice and for assignment of priority in decision situations
when the constraints given by goal specifications and functional requirements
leave freedom for optimising consideration, as for instance related to cost, re-
liability, effort required, emotional aspects, etc.  Choice among possible
strategies in a work situation will depend on performance criteria, i.e., value
aspect assigned to the work process, as well as its product.  Generic relations
define a concept as a member of a set or category in a classical Aristotelian
classification, and can be used to label part of the environment and assign it
to a category for which functional properties are readily available.  The generic
relations are, in particular, useful for drawing formal logical inference (syllo-
gistic reasoning).
Based on this discussion, a summary of mental representations is presented
in figure 4.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for planning human-computer interaction during actual work it
is necessary to consider the interaction between several modes of cognitive
control which are based on quit different kinds of mental representations.
More research is needed for identification of the content and structure of such
mental representations during complex tasks.  In particular, the interaction
between mental processes across cognitive levels and
through time during actual work is important to be able to support decision
making and work by modern information technology.
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Figure 1. Schematic map illustrating different levels in cognitive control of
human behaviour.  The basic level represents the highly skilled sensori-motor
performance controlled by automated patterns of movements.  Sequences of
such sub-routines will be controlled by stored rules, activated by signs.
Problem solving in unfamiliar tasks will be based on conceptual models at the
knowledge based level which serve to generate the necessary rules ad-hoc.
The figure illustrates the flow of information, not the control of this flow.  The
figure is not meant to show humans as passive and subjects to information
'input'.  On the contrary, they actively seek information, guided by their dy-
namic 'world model'.
Figure 2. The problem space of computer trouble shooting can be illustrated
by a map of two dimensions reflecting the level s of abstraction and
decomposition considered in the individual statements of knowledge about the
state of the system.  Generally, in a resource-demand matching decision task,
it will be expected that the decomposition is considered independently at each
level of abstraction.  In the present very selective task of locating a fault with
reference to only one, normal, system state, a common decomposition at all
levels with reference to the physical equipment was feasible for describing the
trace found in verbal protocols.  The figure illustrates the unstructured path
of a specific case; each case will be different.  Therefore, the process
description is unsuited for a design basis model.
Figure 3. The functional properties of a physical system designed to serve
human purposes can be described at several levels of abstraction.  The figure
illustrates that properties related to the purpose of the design, intentional re-
lationships are predominant at the higher levels, while properties derived from
physical properties are predominant at lower levels.
Figure 4. Schematic illustration of the representations of the regularities be-
hind the behaviour of the environment which are used for control of behav-
iour at the different levels of cognitive control.


